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1. Introduction 
 
Legislation mandating equality of pay between women and men was among the 
earliest forms of sex discrimination legislation to be adopted in Britain.  The 
Equal  Pay  Act  1970  predated  the  more  general  prohibition  on  sex 
discrimination in employment by five years.  It  was introduced prior to the 
UK’s  membership  of  the  European  Community  and  at  a  point  when  the 
Community, although it had a Treaty provision governing pay equality between 
women and men, had no Directive on the subject, and prior to the judgments of 
the European Court of Justice which opened up the field of equality law in the 
course of the 1970s.  If the model for the UK Act was more American than 
European, the federal Congress having passed an equal pay law in 1963 and the 
more extensive Civil Rights Act in 1965, the British measure was, in important 
respects,  sui  generis.    It  relied  on  a  combination  of  individual  claims  and 
collective  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  to  achieve  its  objectives,  and  was 
initially successful in combining legal remedies and pre-existing features of the 
industrial relations system to close the pay gap.  In the 1980s and 1990s, when 
collective bargaining was being eclipsed, individual litigation increasingly took 
its  place,  encouraged  by  developments  in  EU  law  and  backed  by  strategic 
support from the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in key cases.  This 
did  not  simply  lead  to  the  radical  reshaping  of  equal  pay  law,  but  had  far-
reaching consequences for payment systems and for industrial relations more 
generally, not least in bringing into the open tensions between unions and their 
own  members.    In  part  because  of  these  destabilizing  effects,  the  model 
embodied in 1970 Act is increasingly being questioned: the law is, at one and 
the  same  time,  highly  complex  and  difficult  to  apply,  while  apparently 
contributing little to the further narrowing of the pay gap.  As a result there is a 
growing debate about whether a shift in regulatory strategy is needed, away 
from direct legal enforcement to a more flexible approach, based around the 
concept of ‘reflexive law’. 
 
This chapter considers the nature of the shift which may now be taking place, 
against  the  backdrop  of  the  evolution  of  equal  pay  law  over  the  past  four 
decades, and recent reviews of the legislation which have set out the case for 
change.  Section 2 provides an overview of the different regulatory approaches 
adopted  in  the  course  of  the  legislation’s  development,  culminating  in  the 
proposals set out in the 2007 Discrimination Law Review.  Section 3 links the 
proposals  in  the  2007  Review  to  the  wider  debate  on  the  role  of  ‘reflexive 
regulation’  in  employment  and  company  law  and  section  4  provides  an 
assessment of whether reflexive approaches are likely to work in the equal pay 
area.  Section 5 concludes.  
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2. The evolution of regulatory strategies in the field of equal pay 
 
The Equal Pay Act 1970 gave an individual worker the right to bring a claim 
against her employer for equality of pay with a comparator of the opposite sex 
who was employed in the same ‘employment’ and ‘establishment’ as she was.  
The legal mechanism by which a successful claim took effect was the insertion 
into the applicant’s contract of an ‘equality clause’ which harmonized her terms 
and conditions of employment with those of her chosen comparator.  The Act, 
although passed in 1970, did not come into force until 1975, during which time 
many payment structures, particularly at sector level, were amended voluntarily 
through  collective  bargaining.    In  addition,  the  compulsory  arbitration 
procedure which was provided for by section 3 of the Act enabled unions to 
bring claims for the realignment of discriminatory pay structures to the Central 
Arbitration  Committee  (‘CAC’),  which  had  the  power  to  amend  entire 
collective  agreements  and  similar  arrangements  at  sector  or  company  level.  
Econometric analysis conducted in the mid-1970s suggested that the narrowing 
of the pay gap which occurred at this time – average hourly wages rose to 
around 70% of men’s by the end of the 1970s, compared to around 60% at the 
start – was the result of a combination of the legal mechanisms set out in the 
Act  and  implementation  of  the  equality  principle  through  centralized  pay 
bargaining (Zabalza and Tzannatos, 1985).   
 
Nevertheless, following several landmark decisions of the European Court of 
Justice (‘ECJ’) in the course of the 1970s and the passage of the Equal Pay 
Directive in 1975, UK law was seen to be out of line with the requirements of 
European Community law, and the Equal Pay Act was amended in 1983 to 
allow claims for equality in the case of work of ‘equal value’ in addition to the 
existing  categories  of  ‘like  work’  and  ‘work  rated  as  equivalent’  under  a 
voluntary job evaluation scheme.   The  amendment was  effected in a highly 
complex  way  and  it  took  some  considerable  time  for  the  litigation  which 
followed  to  establish  clear  parameters  for  equal  pay  claims.    Repeated 
references to the ECJ, given financial and logistic support by the EOC, led to 
significant  extensions  (or  perhaps  clarifications)  of  the  law  in  relation  to 
pension rights, the position of part-time and fixed-term workers, and the scope 
of employers’ defences (see Deakin and Morris, 2005: 576-579).  Although this 
litigation-led approach was successful in reshaping the law, the process was 
often  protracted  (some  cases  took  over  a  decade  to  resolve)  and  induced 
considerable uncertainty for collective agreements and pension schemes.   
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One reason for the prominence accorded to individual claims at this time was 
the diminishing role played by collective bargaining.  The collective arbitration 
route set out in section 3 of the Act was effectively blocked off by the Court of 
Appeal’s  1979  decision  in  the  Hy-Mac  case,  which  decided  that  the  CAC’s 
powers  were  confined  to  cases  of  direct  discrimination  (in  effect,  payment 
structures which were based directly on the criterion of gender) and did not 
extend to cases of indirect discrimination (payment structures which resulted in 
different outcomes by sex by virtue of occupational segregation).  Although the 
ECJ later held (in 1982) that this decision had placed the UK in breach of EC 
law,  amendments  made  to  sex  discrimination  legislation  in  the  mid-1980s, 
rather  than  restoring  the  pre  Hy-Mac  meaning  of  section  3,  repealed  that 
provision  altogether,  putting  in  its  place  a  largely  symbolic  and  practically 
ineffective measure for declaring void provisions of collective agreements or 
similar payment structures which contravened the prohibition on discrimination 
(see Deakin and Morris, 2005: 692-3).  Thus, from the early 1980s onwards, 
individual  litigation  was  the  only  effective  route  by  which  the  equal  pay 
principle  could  be  implemented.    Although  legal  victories  were  often  the 
catalyst  for  collective  agreements  which  led  to  large-scale  realignments  of 
payment structures, the decline in union power in this period undermined the 
potential role of collective bargaining in implementing the goals of legislation.  
Then, in the early 2000s, a series of court decisions allowed individual litigants 
to challenge deals struck by unions and employers and to claim compensation 
from unions themselves in cases where they were held to have failed to pay due 
regard  to  the  equality  principle  in  balancing  competing  claims  of  groups  of 
workers (Dickens, 2007: 483) 
 
At the same time, a substantial gender pay gap remained.  Women’s average 
hourly earnings had reached 75% of men’s by 1988 and the figure rose to 79% 
by 1992 and 82% by 2000 (see Deakin and Morris, 2005: 583 and the sources 
cited there).  In the early 2000s it was largely static, with a further narrowing 
being attributed not to equal pay law but to the introduction from 1999 of the 
national minimum wage (DCLG, 2007; 9).  As a result, attention began to turn 
to alternative and more proactive modes of addressing pay discrimination.  In 
part this took the form of a growing recognition that the Equal Pay Act’s focus 
on the workplace addressed only one part of the problem, and a belief that 
assumptions  about  the  gendered  nature  of  the  division  of  labour  should  be 
challenged through changes to the law governing maternity and paternity rights 
and by reforms to the tax-benefit system (see Fredman, 1997), an agenda which 
was then taken up in the area of ‘work and families’ legislation (Deakin and 
Morris,  2005:  696-713).    In  the  field  of  equal  pay  law  itself,  ‘proactive 
approaches’ put forward included those placing positive duties on organisations 
to take action to overcome institutional discrimination inherent in their policies   4 
and practices, rather than leaving it up to individuals to lay claims.  It was 
argued that these methods would reduce reliance on confrontational litigation 
and shift the emphasis to one of changing organisational behaviour and attitudes 
(Hepple et al., 2000; O’Cinneide, 2003). 
 
One proactive method for addressing pay discrimination that began to be widely 
advocated at this time was that of mandatory equal pay reviews, as part of a 
wider reconsideration of the role of regulatory strategies in discrimination law 
(Hepple et al., 2000). The underlying assumption was that pay discrimination is 
mostly  systemic  and  unseen,  and  as  such  can  only  be  identified  through  a 
systematic analysis of job roles, responsibilities and remuneration. Thus, the 
argument was made that employers should be obligated to examine their pay 
systems  and  identify  and  rectify  any  gender-based  wage  differentials  they 
uncover.  This approach was first adopted in Ontario under its 1987 Pay Equity 
Act (McColgan, 1997), and this lead was then been followed in a number of 
other jurisdictions, including Quebec, Sweden and, most recently, Finland.  
 
In the United Kingdom, a significant step in the same direction was taken when 
the Equal Pay Task Force, which was set up by the EOC in 1999 to explore the 
pay gap 30 years after the introduction of the Equal Pay Act, recommended that 
employers should be required to conduct equal pay reviews on a regular basis. 
The  Task  Force  took  the  view  that  ‘the  vast  majority  of  employers  do  not 
believe they have a gender pay gap and therefore do not believe an equal pay 
review is necessary’; legislation was needed to make reviews mandatory since 
‘the  overwhelming  evidence  to  date  is  that  [employers]  will  not  [introduce 
them] voluntarily’ (Equal Pay Task Force, 2001: xi).  
 
However,  the  official  Government  response  since  then  has  been  to  reject 
compulsion  in  favour  of  public  policy  support  to  encourage  employers  to 
undertake a pay review. Thus, two months after the release of the Equal Pay 
Task  Force  Report,  the  government  commissioned  Denise  Kingsmill  to 
undertake a very similar review into women’s pay and employment, but the 
terms of reference were limited to examining and reporting on non-legislative 
proposals for reducing the pay gap (Kingsmill, 2001).  Given this, it is not 
surprising  that  Kingsmill  recommended  a  voluntarist  rather  than  mandatory 
approach to getting employers to undertake pay reviews.  Significantly, part of 
the reasoning offered was that for the private sector, and in particular large 
companies with stock exchange listings, a combination of reputational effects 
and shareholder activism would put companies under pressures to reform their 
practices.  Here, Kingsmill used the language of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to argue that private sector companies would recognise the business case   5 
for reform.  The main drivers would be the risk and cost of reputational damage 
from  gender  bias,  including  loss  of  shareholder  confidence  and  the 
fragmentation  of  companies’  consumer  base;  the  high  expense  of  equal  pay 
litigation; and costs stemming from an inability to recruit and retain high calibre 
employees.  A different approach was suggested for the public sector, where 
commercial  pressures  would  not  apply  to  the  same  degree:  Kingsmill 
recommended  compulsory  employment  and  pay  reviews  for  public  sector 
organisations, with the findings of reviews to influence the public procurement 
process.   
 
The issue of pay reviews was considered again only a few years later by the 
Women and Work Commission (2006).  The Commission had a wide remit, 
which included a consideration of the issue of gender stereotyping and other 
broader  causes  of  occupational  segregation.  In  relation  to  pay  reviews,  the 
Commission’s  terms  of  reference  did  include  consideration  of  the  case  for 
making  pay  reviews  mandatory  through  legislation.  The  Commission 
recommended a voluntarist approach, however, for the reason that its members 
were unable to reach consensus on the need for compulsion.  Thus, the report 
simply outlined the arguments for and against pay reviews without taking a 
position, and recommended a series of measures intended to raise awareness, 
promote best practice and build employer capacity to address equality issues. In 
common  with  the  Kingsmill  Report,  the  Commission  recommended  a 
mandatory approach in the public sector. 
 
Following on from the recommendations of these successive reports various 
public policy supports were put in place in the 2000s to encourage firms to 
examine their pay systems, as well as to address the issue of gender equity in 
the workplace more generally. The Government launched the so-called Castle 
Awards to encourage and reward firms that displayed excellence in addressing 
equal  pay,  and  it  began  working  with  a  number  of  networks  of  ‘fair  pay 
champions’  such  as  Opportunity  Now  to  promote  best  practice.  The  EOC 
published various documents to encourage and assist firms conduct an equal 
pay review.  One of these was the Code of Practice on Equal Pay (EOC, 2003) 
which set out best practice on compliance with legislation. It stressed that the 
best way for firms to avoid equal pay litigation was to conduct regular equal pay 
reviews  in  consultation  with  their  employees.  In  2003,  the  equal  pay 
questionnaire came into effect, which allowed individual employees to request 
information from their employer if they thought they were not receiving equal 
pay. These combined steps were considered to have raised the profile of equal 
pay reviews in the private sector by the mid-2000s (Neathey et al., 2005). 
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In the public sector, all civil service departments and agencies were required to 
draw up an equal pay action plan in 2003, and in 2006 the Civil Service Reward 
Principles  were  released,  one  of  which  targeted  equal  pay  and  the  need  to 
eliminate pay discrimination. Local authorities were required to conduct a pay 
review  by  2007  under  the  2004  National  Joint  Council  pay  agreement.  In 
addition, the public-sector gender equality duty, which became law in April 
2007, required public authorities to take active steps to promote gender equality 
and eliminate gender discrimination. This placed obligations on public bodies to 
further examine their pay and employment systems. At the same time, several 
high profile equal pay cases involving local authorities highlighted the penalties 
involved for unequal pay and further raised the profile of the equal pay issue.  
 
The Discrimination Law Review of 2007 may well prove to be a turning point 
in  the  debate.    At  the  time  of  writing  the  review  was  only  a  consultation 
document, but it set out a clear vision for the future of anti-discrimination law in 
the UK, with the Government’s position on certain issues very clear. And in the 
area of equal pay reviews, the influence of both the Kingsmill Report and the 
Women and Work Commission was clear. Thus, no consultation was invited 
over this issue, with the Review arguing that the likely costs of enforced pay 
reviews would outweigh the benefits, and as such, would ‘contravene better 
regulation principles’. Instead, it favoured an approach based on ‘promoting the 
spread of good practice’ as well as mechanisms to increase the ‘reputational 
benefits’ for firms that undertake them voluntarily (DCLG, 2007: para3.7-3.8). 
 
However,  the  Review  was  not  confined  to  equal  pay  or  indeed  to  sex 
discrimination law, but covered legal issues arising from the full range of anti-
discrimination provisions (sex, race, disability, age, gender reassignment, sexual 
orientation,  and  religion  or  belief),  one  of  its  objectives  being  to  provide  a 
framework for a new Single Equality Act.  Its broad approach can be described 
as one based on ‘reflexive regulation’, as McCrudden (2007: 4) has suggested: 
various elements in the report, ‘when taken together, amount… to the partial 
adoption of reflexive regulation which… is quite different in significant respects 
from those methods of anti-discrimination regulation that have gone before’.  
These elements ranged from a new emphasis on the business case for equality, 
to  references  to  the  diffusion  of  good  practice  in  contradistinction  to 
enforcement  strategies  based  on  strict  legal  compliance,  and  to  the  role  of 
engagement with stakeholders.  Specific proposals included amendments to the 
law  to  allow  greater  scope  for  positive  action  by  employers  in  favour  of 
workforce  diversity,  and  the  replacement  of  specific  aspects  of  the  duty  of 
public  sector  bodies  to  promote  equality  with  a  more  general  test  of 
proportionality. 
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3. The meaning of ‘reflexive regulation’ 
 
What, then, is reflexive regulation?  It is perhaps easier to say what it is not.  It 
is generally contrasted to, on the one hand, ‘command-and-control’ forms of 
regulation which are based on prescriptive and detailed controls and supported 
by penal or civil sanctions for non-compliance; and, on the other, deregulation 
of the kind which removes statutory controls altogether in favour of a return to 
individual  freedom  of  contract  or  (which  may  amount  to  the  same  thing) 
market-based governance.  The critique of the command-and-control approach 
maintains that there are limits to the effectiveness of legal regulation in the face 
of alternative sources of norms beyond the law.  These alternatives range from 
relatively  formal  systems  of self-regulation,  such as  collective  bargaining  or 
financial  codes  of  conduct,  to  informal  social  norms  and  tacit  conventions 
which may shape behaviour in particular contexts.  The idea can be expressed 
more formally using the language of autopoiesis or systems theory, which posits 
a radical separation of the legal system from the social sub-systems which it is 
seeking  to  regulate  (Teubner,  1992).    Legal  rules,  it  is  suggested,  rely  on 
linguistic  forms  and  institutional  processes  which  are  particular  to  the  legal 
system  itself  and  translate  incompletely,  at  best,  into  the  economic  or 
organisational contexts in which legal rules are intended to be applied.  The 
more detailed and prescriptive attempts at regulation are, the less successful 
they tend to be in achieving their desired goals, a phenomenon which feeds back 
into the legal system in the form of the ‘juridification’ of law, implying the 
over-specification of rules and excessive detail and complexity in the form of 
the law, particularly legislation. 
 
More positively, the theory also emphasizes the possibilities of matching legal 
rules  more  effectively  to  the  various  tasks  which  regulation  is  called  on  to 
perform.  ‘Reflexive law’ can, it is argued, be designed in such a way as to 
stimulate  self-regulation  of  the  kind  which  will  fulfill  policy  objectives.  
Reflexive  law  is  therefore  associated,  to  some  degree,  with  a  shift  from 
substantive to procedural norms.  Legal interventions are often characterized as 
reflexive when they make use of default rules and other quasi-optional forms of 
regulation.    These  allow  the  parties  to  self-regulatory  arrangements  –  for 
example, trade unions and employers in the context of collective bargaining – to 
vary the terms of statutory norms, which, as a result, cease to be completely 
mandatory.  In this way the application of the law is tailored to local conditions.  
In  such  fields  as  working  time,  equal  treatment  of  part-time  and  fixed-term 
workers and information and consultation of employees, legislation sets default 
rules  which  can  be  varied  by  agreement  –  so  called  ‘bargained  statutory 
adjustments’ (Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004) – but only if certain conditions are 
met.  In a sense, the law has been ‘proceduralised’ – a standard which was   8 
previously substantive, in the sense (for example) of setting an absolute limit to 
working  time,  is  now,  in  part  at  least,  procedural.    The  law  is  no  longer 
exclusively concerned with setting the contents of the relevant norm, but also 
with stipulating the procedure by which the norm can be modified.   
 
Reflexive  law  also  has  a  hybrid  quality  which  is  suggested  by  the  way  it 
combines sanctions of different types.  The influential ‘pyramid of enforcement’ 
model  developed  by  Ayres  and  Braithwaite  (1992)  and  extended  to 
discrimination  law  by  Hepple  et  al.  (2000)  presupposes  that  hard  sanctions, 
possibly penal ones, must be exercised if all else fails.  The model assumes that 
the application of legal sanctions will hardly ever have to occur – these are the 
few cases occupying the apex of the ‘pyramid’ – but it is important that the 
possibility should exist in order to maintain the stability of the overall structure.  
Many apparent cases of financial self-regulation depend on the existence, as a 
matter of last resort, of hard sanctions of this kind.   
 
A common thread uniting the different conceptions of reflexive law is the idea 
that the role of the law is to promote a learning process around the question of 
‘what works best’ as a route to achieving social or economic policy goals.  Thus 
the law recognises or validates a range of potential solutions, while at the same 
time using benchmarking procedures and other deliberative mechanisms to set 
up a series of tests for determining their relative success or failure.  In order for 
such deliberative strategies to be effective, some have argued that attention has 
to be given to the issue of the ‘frame’: ‘the hypothesis of reflexive governance 
holds that the conditions under which a deliberative process may succeed can be 
identified, and once identified, must be affirmatively created, rather than taken 
for  granted’  (De  Schutter  and  Deakin,  2005:  3).    In  that  sense,  reflexive 
regulation is governance by design, rather than a process left entirely to the 
forces of spontaneous order.   
 
At the same time there are limits to what can be achieved by design alone.  For 
reflexive  strategies  to  be  effective,  institutions  and  mechanisms  must  be  in 
place, beyond the law, to receive and translate reflexive legal norms in a way 
which  makes  their  implementation  effective.    In  theoretical  terms,  this 
presupposes the existence of bridging institutions which assist the ‘structural 
coupling’ of the legal system with the organisational and market contexts in 
which the rules are intended to be applied.  Such institutions may include, in the 
employment  law  context,  collective  bargaining  or  other  possible  forms  of 
workplace-based  deliberation  such  as  employee  consultation  (Barnard  et  al., 
2003).    Thus  another  critical  issue  is  whether  social  institutions  have  the 
capacity to play the role ascribed to them by reflexive regulatory strategies.  To   9 
the extent that they do not, the law may have to undertake a capacity building 
role. 
 
The debate over the role CSR provides an illustration of this point.  In principle, 
CSR can be quite effectively integrated into a reflexive approach to regulation.  
CSR involves an appeal to companies to go ‘beyond compliance’ since by doing 
so they can better preserve their competitiveness and prepare themselves to deal 
with future shocks.  The business case for CSR intersects with the regulatory 
argument for limiting the role of the law to that of providing a framework which 
will  reward  those  organisations  which  can  most  effectively  internalise  their 
social costs.  One of the regulatory techniques associated with this approach is 
the use of disclosure rules and reporting requirements to generate a flow of 
information about the way in which companies handle the issue of externalities.  
This  issue  has  appeared  on  the  policy  agenda  in  the  UK  as  a  result  of  the 
protracted debate over the introduction of a statutory ‘operating and financial 
review’  (‘OFR’)  which  would  require  large  companies  to  produce  annual 
reports  on  how  they  were  dealing  with  various  aspects  of  their  social  and 
environmental performance. The somewhat diluted form of this provision which 
was eventually brought into force by the Companies Act 2006, the ‘business 
review’, is, despite the changes made after the government abandoned the OFR 
in 2005, a measure with the potential to stimulate processes of benchmarking 
and peer review, when coupled with the active participation of social actors in 
the evaluation process.  Changes in pensions law have also been introduced 
with the aim of stimulating a greater interest in social and environmental issues 
on  the  part  of  institutional  investors;  legislation  requiring  pension  funds  to 
disclose their voting policy and to state the extent to which social, ethical and 
environmental investment matters are taken into consideration, came into force 
in the UK in 2001.  The Association of British Insurers has taken the view that 
this  requirement  has  had  a  ‘significant  and  wide-ranging  impact  on  the 
investment community…[and has] added significantly to the growing Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) movement’ (ABI, 2001: 13).  These measures 
can therefore be seen as ‘capacity building’ mechanisms in the sense identified 
by reflexive theory. 
 
How successful is this strategy likely to be in the context of discrimination law, 
and equal pay in particular?   
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4. The prospects for the reflexive regulation of pay inequality: theory and 
evidence 
 
As we have seen, a core aspect of the theory of reflexive law is the rejection of 
models based on spontaneous order.  Reflexive approaches, far from advocating 
complete  deregulation,  contemplate  a  version  of  ‘market  steering’  which 
presupposes a role for the legal ‘frame’.  Two dimensions of this problem are 
critical: the appropriate role of sanctions, and the role of the law in capacity 
building.  Here  we firstly examine the empirical research, before discussing 
whether a voluntary approach to equal pay adequately addresses either of these 
dimensions. 
 
The  empirical  research  suggests  that  a  voluntary  approach  has  had  limited 
impact in persuading private sector firms to conduct pay reviews. The EOC 
commissioned four surveys between 2002 and 2005 looking at the extent of 
equal pay reviews among organisations in 2002 (Adams et al., 2006; Brett and 
Milsome, 2004; Neathey et al., 2003; Schafer et al., 2005). While there was 
some increase in the number of large (500+ employees) private sector firms that 
had conducted an equal pay review between 2003 (14%) and 2004 (33%), in the 
2005 survey this figured was almost unchanged (34%). More than half of large 
private sector firms reported no past equal pay review activity, nor any intention 
to conduct one in the future, and only 5% had an equal pay review in progress. 
Once small and medium sized organisations were included the picture was even 
less positive. 82% of organisations in the 2005 survey had not conducted an 
equal pay review, did not have one in progress and did not intend to conduct 
one (Adams et al., 2006). These survey results are supported by data in the 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), which showed only 24% of 
firms  were  monitoring  their  recruitment  and  selection,  only  10%  were 
monitoring promotion, and only 7% were reviewing their relative pay rates for 
indirect gender discrimination (Kersley et al., 2006).  
 
There is therefore little reason to revise the view of the Equal Pay Task Force in 
2001, to the effect that the majority of employers do not think that they have 
pay equity issues to resolve, a conclusion that the EOC has also reached in now 
advocating for equal pay reviews to be made mandatory. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the issue of the ‘frame’ is concerned with the 
role of legal rules in setting appropriate incentives for self-regulation.  From this 
point of view,  and in the light of the evidence concerning voluntary audits, 
making pay audits mandatory should be considered as  a viable option here.  
This would not amount to committing employers to any particular outcome, but   11 
it would require them to undertake a regular review process and to disclose the 
results.  Enforced audits are therefore comparable to mandatory disclosure rules 
which in other contexts (such as corporate governance) are seen as playing a 
vital role in stimulating learning without dictating the final form of solutions 
arrived at by employers.   
 
Evidence from Ontario illustrates that such learning can take place, but only 
when the right ‘frame’ is in place. Here, mandatory pay reviews have had only 
limited success due to a lack of monitoring, which has meant high levels of non-
compliance  (Baker  and  Fortin,  1999)  and  manipulation  of  the  process  by 
employers  where  unions  are  not  involved  (McColgan,  1997).  The  most 
successful reflexive governance seems to occur in organisations where strong 
unions exist and the process is jointly managed. The Canadian Pay Equity Task 
Force (2004) notes that both employers and unions in such firms report that they 
have gained a greater appreciation of the skills involved in many traditional 
female roles as a result of conducting job evaluations and that there have been 
self-worth benefits for the workers themselves in having the skills involved in 
their  work  identified  and  acknowledged.  The  report  also  notes  that  jointly 
conducted pay reviews have often led to better industrial relations, in contrast to 
the adversarialism that a complaints-based system engenders. In some cases, 
unions  have  reached  agreements  where  they  bargained  away  the  statutory 
requirement to conduct a pay review (breaching the legislation) in exchange for 
more generous pay rises for female dominated jobs (McColgan, 1993). 
 
This last point raises an important issue in the debate over self-regulation in the 
employment  law  field,  and  that  is  how  to  protect  appropriate  voluntary 
arrangements from external legal challenge.  In the case of ‘bargained statutory 
adjustments’, as we have seen earlier, this involves giving priority to collective 
or workforce agreements over statutory standards as long as certain procedural 
safeguards are met.  The 2007 Review considered adopting a similar scheme for 
equal pay, in the form of an ‘equal pay moratorium’.  This would mean that 
‘where  an  employer  carries  out  an  equal  pay  review  and  identifies  gender 
inequalities in their pay systems, they would have a set period free from legal 
challenge,  within  which  to  rectify  discriminatory  pay  policies  and  practices’ 
(DCLG, 2007: para. 3.23).  But while acknowledging that this move would 
‘have the advantage of helping employers to address the issue of equal pay’, the 
Review came down against it on the grounds that to dilute individual rights in 
this way might run counter to EU law, as well as leading to uncertainty about 
the position of individuals if the issue of pay inequality were not effectively 
reviewed during a moratorium (DCLG, 2007: para. 3.24).  
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In  rejecting  the  case  for  equal  pay  moratoria,  the  Review  gave  little 
encouragement to collective solutions at workplace level.  Research suggests 
that such solutions will not emerge ‘spontaneously’ if the right conditions are 
not put in place at the level of the legislative ‘frame’.  Barnard et al. (2003) 
looked  at  the  way  in  which  employers  were  achieving  flexibility  in  the 
application of the legislation implementing the Working Time Directive.  They 
found that very little use was being made of the collective routes to working 
time flexibility – those based on collective or workforce agreements – given the 
ease with which employers could impose opt-outs on individual workers.  The 
wide derogation allowed by the legislation for individual agreements meant that 
an opportunity had been lost to generate a process of collective learning, based 
on deliberation at workplace level.  As a result, the legislation had had little 
impact  in  changing  prevailing  organisational  practices:  most  employers 
continued to rely on a mixture of long working-hours to meet peaks in demand, 
while employees remained dependent on overtime earnings to supplement their 
pay.   
 
In defence of the Review, the issue of how to reconcile individual claims with 
collective  procedures  is  not  straightforward.    The  history  of  equal  pay 
legislation suggests that the two routes can be complementary; as noted above, 
litigation often provided the catalyst for collective agreements which brought 
about significant progress in removing institutionalised disadvantage in relation 
to  pay  and  other  employment  conditions.    More  recently,  however,  clear 
tensions have surfaced.  In Allen v GMB (2005) an employment tribunal ruled 
that the union had acted in a discriminatory fashion in concluding a collective 
agreement which purported to implement the equal pay principle, and awarded 
damages to the applicants.  Although the ruling was reversed on appeal, the 
Allen litigation represents a direct challenge to collective approaches; there is 
now less room for collective agreements to balance the interests of different 
workforce  groups,  and  any  attempt  to  trade  off  the  implementation  of  the 
equality  principle  against  other  union  interests  (such  as  the  preservation  of 
employment,  a  real  concern  in  the  public  sector)  would  be  fraught  with 
difficulty from a legal perspective.  Nor does the potential liability of unions 
end there.  In one week alone in the summer of 2007, several thousand claims 
were issued against trade unions alleging negligence in the way equal pay cases 
had been handled (‘Who’s best at getting equal pay for women?’ The Observer, 
12.8.07.)   
 
These developments suggest that litigation-based routes towards enforcement 
show no signs of diminishing in importance in the UK system, and that having 
been  complementary  to  self-regulatory  approaches  based  on  collective 
bargaining in the past, they now have the potential to undermine the capacity of   13 
unions to act in the equal pay field.  One of the preconditions for the success of 
a reflexive strategy, namely the presence of effective employee representation at 
workplace level, is looking less secure by the day.   
 
Perhaps  the  continuing  demise  of  collective  bargaining  matters  less  when 
alternative  mechanisms,  in  the  area  of  corporate  governance,  are  taken  into 
account.  But to take this view would be, at best, naïve.  The proactive role for 
the shareholder activism which Kingsmill emphasised has yet to be realised.   In 
part  this  is  because  of  the  troubled  legislative  history  of  attempts  to  extend 
corporate  reporting  requirements  on  employment  issues;  the  government’s 
abrogation of the OFR in December 2005, followed by its partial rebirth in the 
form of the business review, has both diluted and delayed the implementation of 
new  disclosure  rules.    But  there  is  also  empirical  evidence  that  institutional 
supports  for  shareholder  activism  of  the  kind  envisaged  by  Kingsmill  are 
lacking (Deakin and Hobbs, 2007).  Notwithstanding the growth of interest in 
SRI, it remains a niche segment of asset management.  Pension funds, although 
legally required to disclose how far CSR affects their investment strategies, are 
also constrained by fiduciary law and by financial regulations in the degree to 
which they can direct fund managers to take employment issues into account 
when making voting or investment decisions.  Uncertainty affecting the funding 
of many defined benefit pension funds, coupled with an increasing degree of 
stock market turbulence, have meant that many funds still pay little regard to 




This paper has considered the evolution of regulatory strategies in the area of 
equal pay between women and men since the inception of equal pay legislation 
in the 1970s.  There is a case for saying that the legislation was most successful 
in  the  first  years  of  its  operation  when an  interventionist  legal  strategy  was 
linked  to  the  use  of  collective  bargaining  to  put  the  equality  principle  into 
practice.    Of  course,  this  was  also  the  point  at  which  some  of  the  more 
egregious examples of pay discrimination – including separate grades in job 
evaluation schemes and collective agreements for women and men- could be 
easily identified and rectified.  However, the failure of the legislation to go on to 
deal  with  indirect  sex  discrimination,  arising  from  occupational  segregation, 
was due not to inherent difficulty of applying the law in this area, but more 
straightforwardly  to  the  weakening  and  then  removal  of  the  collective 
arbitration mechanism which had been contained in section 3 of the Act.  The 
individual claims route which came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s produced 
some  spectacular  legal  victories  which  led  to  fundamental  changes  in  the   14 
content and structure of equality law, but led to an ever more complex body of 
legislation  which,  in  turn,  contained  the  potential  for  seriously  destabilizing 
existing  payment  structures.    While  this  could,  from  one  point  of  view,  be 
justified as an inevitable feature of the application of the equality principle to 
established procedures, a more fundamental critique would point to the dangers 
inherent  in  growing  employer  resistance  to  the  aims  of  the  law  and  union 
disenchantment with the prevailing approach to its enforcement. 
 
It against this background that the case for reflexive regulation has come to the 
fore as a way of making the operation of equal pay legislation more effective in 
practice.  ‘Reflexive’ approaches involve a shift from litigation-based and other 
‘hard law’ strategies to a range of self-regulatory mechanisms and proactive 
measures for embedding the equality principle in organisational practice.  A 
discussion about the role of such mechanisms has been going on since the early 
2000s  in  the  context  of  pay  audits.      Discrimination  Law  Review  of  2007 
marked a potentially significant step in extending reflexive techniques, which 
have been widely used elsewhere in the labour law field, to equality law as a 
whole.  However, the recommendations made by the Review in the area of 
equal pay reflected certain ambiguities which are inherent in the concept of 
reflexive law, and highlight certain of its limitations.   
 
The  ambiguity  of  reflexive  law  relates  to  a  lack  of  clarity  concerning  the 
relationship between mandatory law and flexible enforcement mechanisms.  It 
is inherent in theories of reflexive law, and in much of the practice over the past 
decade or so since the idea started to gain acceptance, that legal sanctions have 
to be deployable as a matter of last resort if legal changes are to have an impact 
on  practice.    This  means,  conversely,  that  self-regulatory  solutions  must  be 
accorded  some  protection  from  the  impact  of  more  direct  legal  intervention 
once they pass certain thresholds of acceptability. This is the approach used in 
the context of ‘bargained statutory adjustments’ in the area of working time law 
and the default options which operate in relation to employee representation. 
But in the current context of equal pay law, these routes are not available, and 
the  option  of  promoting  equal  pay  reviews  by  securing  them  from  legal 
challenge was ruled out in the Review itself.  The limitations of reflexive law 
derive from the dependence of this technique on social institutions beyond the 
legal system which, in the manner of ‘bridging mechanisms’, can assist in the 
translation  of  legal  norms  into  workplace  and  organisational  practice.    A 
reflexive strategy is unlikely to be effective in the context of equal pay law at a 
time when collective bargaining is being undermined by a number of factors 
including equal pay litigation itself, and when the institutional preconditions for 
alternative  ‘bridging  mechanisms’,  such  as  shareholder  activism,  do  not  yet 
exist.    For  all  that,  it  seems  that  discrimination  law  is  currently  taking  a   15 
reflexive  turn.    It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  will  make  the  law  more 
effective and workable in practice.    
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